

# CIMUN VI

Chicago International Model United Nations  
Chicago, IL • December 10-13, 2009

## **International Atomic Energy Agency** Background Guide



mun<sup>do</sup>

Dear Delegates,

It is our distinct pleasure to welcome you to the sixth annual Chicago International Model United Nations. If this is your first time as a delegate at CIMUN, you will soon realize that this will be unlike any other conference that you have ever attended. All committees at CIMUN feature a fully-integrated crisis simulation, forcing delegates to think on their feet and work between multiple committees to solve challenging problems in a variety of forums.

From the General Assembly and Security Council to the Cabinets and Regional Bodies, all committees at CIMUN are vital participants in the crisis, and successful delegations will have to work as a team to coordinate their efforts to best promote their national interests, simulating the work of actual diplomats and politicians. As a result, this background guide and the committee topics you have been assigned are intended only as a starting point. It is much more important to be familiar with the “character” and vital interests of your country than to focus on specifics, as you will inevitably be placed in many situations where you will be forced to think outside of the box and make important decisions in real-time. To assist you with this challenge, we encourage you to take full advantage of our extensive Home Government and Simulations staff and the variety of other resources that will be available during the conference.


Additionally, CIMUN employs a much different philosophy than most other high school conferences. Instead of forcing delegates to work towards unrealistic compromises and pass “consensus” resolutions at any cost, we encourage you to faithfully represent your national interests and to always place your country’s strategic motivations, both public and covert, at the forefront, even if it means being confrontational. Our crisis has been specially designed to pit the interests of key players against each other in ways that will involve every country at the conference, and we strongly advise you to always keep your nation’s own interests in mind.

We will continue to post more specifics, updates, and research materials as the date of the conference approaches. Information on Position Papers and other requirements can be found on our website in the “Position Papers” section. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us or your committee dais. See you in December!

Sincerely,

Greg Young  
Undersecretary-General of Simulations  
[usgsims@cimun.org](mailto:usgsims@cimun.org)

Tyler Doyle  
Director of Present Day Simulation



## INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

### **Topic 1: Nuclear Proliferation in Central Asia**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) encourages the safe and appropriate use of nuclear material. Currently, there has been noted nuclear proliferation in Central Asia and the IAEA already has implemented several safeguards to encourage non-proliferation. Notably, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to act as a global anchor for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Though the NPT is flawed, it provides security benefits such as providing assurance that nuclear energy is not being misused for weapon purposes in non-nuclear-weapon States. Members of the NPT that have nuclear weapons include: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Non-members of the NPT that have or are speculated to have nuclear weapons include: Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Israeli officials have never confirmed or denied that the country possesses nuclear materials.

The IAEA also requires nuclear states to adhere to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 which prohibits non-State actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear weapons. It also establishes controls to prevent nuclear proliferation. Despite these measures, the IAEA continues to verify the presence of undeclared nuclear programs, notably in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

In regards to Central Asia, the IAEA has enacted a treaty which joins five states in the region, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ). The CANWFZ takes a step to further reach the goal of eliminating the use of nuclear weapons around the world, and is the first such treaty to explicitly oblige Central Asian countries to accept enhanced IAEA safeguards. The treaty also requires Parties to meet international standards regarding security of nuclear facilities, which could reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism or nuclear weapons smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials in the region.

The CANWFZ is also the first treaty to encompass states of the former Soviet Union, as well as the first in the northern hemisphere. The use of nuclear materials is sanctioned under the treaty as long as the uses are within the mandates set forth by the IAEA. The treaty also encompasses an environmental component which addresses concerns unique to the Central Asian region. Each of the five States hosted former Soviet nuclear weapons infrastructure and now confront common problems of environmental remediation damage resulting from the production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons. The CANWFZ joins three existing Weapon-Free Zones (WFZ) which are: Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. The IAEA is working on enact a fifth treaty known as the Pelinaba Treaty, which will cover Africa.

Despite the marked progress made by the enactment of the CANWFZ treaty, proliferation in Central Asia still remains a vital concern, especially on the part of non-state actors. The political fragility of the region has led to the outbreak of numerous

conflicts that undermines the legitimate authorities in the region and the rise of many rebel groups wielding significant power and influence. This is especially alarming given the rise of Islamist groups in many Central Asian countries, many with ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The desire of these groups to obtain nuclear weapons is clear, and the IAEA must take decisive action to ensure that the governments of Central Asia have the tools necessary to prevent this and enforce the provisions of the nuclear free zone.

## **Topic 2: Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East**

The board of governors of the IAEA has established a set of guidelines in regards to the application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East. The IAEA continues to follow the protocol of the 2004 conference. The IAEA recognizes the need for Middle Eastern states to accept the Agency's safeguards in order to build confidence among all States in the region as well as for the purpose of enhancing peace and security in order to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). The IAEA also states that the application of IAEA Safeguards is not only for nuclear safety, but is also important when considering the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

According to the 2004 Board of Governors review, the situation in the Middle East is as follows:

“All States of the Middle East region except for Israel are parties to the NPT. The United Arab Emirates has brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement. As of 31 July 2004, eight States of the Middle East region that are party to the NPT had yet to bring into force their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to that Treaty. Two of those States have signed but not yet ratified their NPT comprehensive safeguards agreements. Additional Protocols are in force or otherwise applied in four States of the region, while one State has signed but not yet brought into force an Additional Protocol, and an Additional Protocol has been approved for another State in the region”.

Since the publication of this report, the IAEA has established its long term goal to convert the entire Middle Eastern region into a NWFZ, but such a lofty process must begin with the enactment of the previously established safeguards.

One reoccurring problem that prevents the IAEA from achieving this goal is that there continues to be a general lack of clarity on the substance and specifics of an agreement to establish a Middle East NWFZ. The Secretariat may therefore not be in a position at this stage to embark on the preparations of the model agreements foreseen in the resolution. The IAEA continues to consult and work with States of the Middle East to find the common ground required to develop the model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ.

As with Central Asia, there is a great risk of non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East due to the divisive nature of the region's conflicts. These concerns are magnified by the fact that, though they have never openly admitted it, it is well known that Israel possesses its own nuclear arsenal, leading many groups and even states to fear for their own existence in the face of such a threat. This unique situation, paired with the undeniable geopolitical significance of the region, makes controlling the

spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East a unique and challenging priority that the IAEA must reassess.

### **Topic 3: Facilitating the Secure Transport of Nuclear Material**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides advisory services to states in order to establish infrastructure that will protect nuclear and other radioactive materials from malicious acts such as theft and diversion. It also acts to prevent sabotage and malicious acts against the transportation of radioactive materials. The IAEA helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities in security of radioactive materials and supports states in their efforts to detect and respond to malicious activities. Additionally, the IAEA assists states in the implementation of nuclear security initiatives by helping to develop a modern security infrastructure.

The IAEA has developed concepts and procedures for handling radiological threats which are implemented through international conferences, training courses, and security guidance publications. Recently, the IAEA has released a guide which discusses the precautions for the security of radioactive sources. One of the main catalysts for the publishing of this guide was the growing concern that criminal groups could get access to radioactive sources. The danger of malicious activity with nuclear devices has led to a trend toward increased accountability, control, and security of radioactive sources. In September of 2005, the Board of Governors approved a New Security Plan for nuclear resources which applies from 2006 to 2009. The plan focuses on three areas which include the following: protecting radioactive material, facilities, and transports from malicious acts, detecting and responding to malicious acts involving radioactive materials, and analysis to support the implementation of the plan set forth by the IAEA.

There are several fundamental security documents that the IAEA adheres to with regards to the security of Nuclear Material. These documents include the following: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Safeguards agreements and their additional protocols, Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles, INFCIRC/223/Rev.4, and Nuclear Security- Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism.

When looking at the secure transport of nuclear materials, the Division of Radiation, Transport, and Waste Safety (NSRW) develops and maintains the standards for the safe transport of nuclear materials. Specifically, the regulatory infrastructure and transport safety section provides member states with safety standards, guidance, and tools for the control of the safe transport of nuclear materials. It also manages information in order to improve the safety of transport in specific member states.

### **Selected Resources:**

Nuclear Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism  
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n013.html>

Global Map of Nuclear Arsenals (BBC)  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in\\_depth/7979757.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7979757.stm)

UN Security Council Resolutions  
[http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/sc\\_resolutions.htm](http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/sc_resolutions.htm)

Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia  
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/canwftztrety.html>

IAEA Report: Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East  
[http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/English/gc48-18\\_en.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/English/gc48-18_en.pdf)

IAEA Nuclear Security Portal  
<http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/default.htm>

IAEA News: Helping Countries Keep Radioactive Sources Secure  
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/saferadsources.html>

Fundamental Nuclear Security Documents  
[http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/security\\_documents.htm](http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/security_documents.htm)